Abstract In response to the liar's paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. (Martin and Woodruff independently developed this semantics, but not to the same extent as Kripke.) Kripke's work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of the land amid a variety of options. Our results will also provide technical fodder for the methodological remarks of the companion paper to this one.
2 Given a ground model M for L, we can think of I(X) as the interpretation or, to borrow an expression from Gupta and Belnap [3] , the signification of X, where X is a name, function symbol or relation symbol. Gupta and Belnap characterize an expression's or concept's signification in a world w as "an abstract something that carries all the information about the expression's [or concept's] extensional relations in w." If we want to interpret Tx as "x is true", then, given a ground model M, we would like to find an appropriate signification, or an appropriate range of significations, for T.
We might try to expand a classical ground model M = D, I for L to a classical model M = D, I for L + . For T to express truth, M should assign the same truth value to the sentences T'A' and A, for every sentence A of L + . Unfortunately, not every ground model M = D, I can thus be expanded: if λ is a (nonquote) name of L and if I(λ) = ¬Tλ, then I (λ) = ¬Tλ, so that T'¬Tλ' and Tλ are assigned the same truth value by M ; so T'¬Tλ' and ¬Tλ are assigned different truth values by M . This is a formalization of the liar's paradox, with the sentence ¬Tλ as the offending liar's sentence.
In a semantics for languages capable of expression their own truth concepts, T will not, in general, have a classical signification. Kripke [8] and Martin and Woodruff [10] present the fixed-point semantics for such languages. Kripke suggests a whole host of related approaches to the problem of assigning, given a ground model M, a signification to T. Gupta and Belnap [3] present their revision theories in contrast to the various fixed-point options presented by Kripke. In the current paper, we motivate three different ways of comparing fixedpoint and revision theories of truth, and we establish the various relationships the theories have to one another in these three different senses. The general point of this is to help us get the lay of the land amid the variety of choices.
There is a more specific use we make of the comparisons: in the companion paper to this one, [7] , we use the current results to critique on of Gupta and Belnap's motivations for their revision-theoretic approach, i.e., their claim that the revision theory has the advantage of treating truth like a classical concept when there is no vicious reference.
In the course of our investigation, we close two problems left open by Gupta and Belnap [3] . We also give a simplified proof of their "Main Lemma".
Fixed-Point Semantics
The intuition behind the fixed-point semantics is that pathological sentences such as the liar sentence are neither true nor false. 3 In general, a three-valued model for a first-order language L is just like a classical model, except that the function I assigns, to each n-place relation symbol, a function from D n to {t, f, n}. A classical model is a special case of a three-valued model. Officially t(rue), f(alse) and n(either) are three truth values, but n can be thought of a the absence of a truth value. 4 We order the truth values as follows: n ≤ n ≤ t ≤ t and n ≤ n ≤ f ≤ f. Given a three-valued model M = D, I and an assignment s of values to the variables, the value Val M,s (t) ∈ D of each term t is defined in the standard way. The atomic formula Rt 1 . . . t n is assigned the truth value I(R)(Val M,s (t 1 ), . . . , Val M,s (t n )). To evaluate composite formulas, we must have some evaluation scheme: for example, if A is f(alse) and B is n(either), then we must decide whether (A & B) is f or n.
For classical models, we will just use the standard classical evaluation scheme, τ : If M is a classical model for L and A is a sentence of L, then Val M,τ (A) is simply the standard truth value of A in M. For nonclassical three-valued models, we will consider the weak Kleene scheme, μ, and the strong Kleene scheme, κ. The Kleene schemes treat negation identically: ¬t = f, 3 We follows the presentation in [3] of the fixed-point semantics and of the revision theory of truth. Much of this material is culled from [3] and elsewhere. Among the numbered definitions, theorems, and lemmas, those not explicitly attributed to a source are original to the current paper. 4 We do not consider four-valued models, with the additional truth value b(oth). See Visser [13, 14] and Woodruff [15] . The hypotheses meeting our conditions, above, under which T expresses truth, are the fixed points of the jump operator ρ M : the hypotheses h such that ρ M (h) = h. The fixed points deliver, for the language L + , models M + h satisfying what M. Kremer [6] calls "the fixed point conception of truth", according to which, as Kripke [8] put it, "we are entitled to assert (or deny) of a sentence that it is true precisely under the circumstances when we can assert (or deny) the sentence itself."
Kripke [8] proves that each of μ M , κ M and σ M has a fixed point for every ground model M. In fact, Kripke's results are stronger. These results yield a number of plausible significations of T: the fixed points generated by your favourite evaluation scheme. Many have considered the proposal that the least fixed point yields the correct signification of T. 5 M. Kremer [6] decisively argues that Kripke [8] does not endorse this proposal, and that this proposal misinterprets the fixed-point semantics: the fixed-point conception of truth favours no particular fixed point. Kremer emphasizes a tension between the fixed-point conception of truth and another intuition, the "supervenience of semantics": the intuition that the interpretation of T should be determined by the interpretation of the nonsemantic names, function symbols and relation symbols.
The disagreement between a supervenience fixed-point theorist-for specificity, say a least-fixed-point theorist using the strong Kleene scheme-and a nonsupervenience fixed-point theorist (using the same evaluation scheme) can be brought out as follows. Suppose that, other than their use of T, the discourse of two communities X and Y is represented by the same ground language L interpreted by the same ground model M, but that X's use of T is represented by the least fixed point, h X and Y's use of T is represented by some
κ be the interpreted languages spoken by X and Y. According to the least-fixedpoint theorist, community X uses T to express truth in L X , but community Y does not use T to express truth in L Y -despite the fact that, in L Y , the sentences A and T'A' have the same truth value for each sentence A of L + . According to the nonsupervenience theorist, on the other hand, communities X and Y use T to express truth in L X and L Y , respectively, because h X and h Y are fixed points: each community's use of T satisfies the necessary and, for the nonsupervenientist, sufficient conditions for T to express truth in the community's language.
We have on board two proposals for interpreting the fixed-point semantics. On the supervenience proposal, the language spoken by a community is determined by its use of nonsemantic vocabulary-represented by a ground model-and the interpretation of T as truth is given by some particular fixed point, usually assumed to be the least fixed point. The greatest intrinsic fixed point might also seem natural: "The largest intrinsic fixed point is the unique 'largest' interpretation of Tx which is consistent with our intuitive idea of truth and makes no arbitrary choices in truth assignments. It is thus an object of special theoretical interest." (Kripke [8] .) On the nonsupervenience proposal, the language spoken by the community is not determined by its use of nonsemantic vocabulary: the communities X and Y, in the preceding paragraph, speak distinct languages in which T expresses truth, despite a shared ground model. If we fix an evaluation scheme and a ground model, any fixed point provides an acceptable signification of truth.
We will not adjudicate between these two proposals. Rather, we will introduce a number of supervenience theories of truth, which depend on which evaluation scheme we use, and on whether we privilege the least fixed point or the greatest intrinsic fixed point. One reason to restrict ourselves to the supervenience approach is that Gupta and Belnap's revision theories depend on the supervenience of semantics, and so it is the supervenience fixed-point theories that are most readily comparable to the revision theories.
Definition 2.1 Let
We define the set of sentences valid in M according to such and such a theory as follows:
Before we consider revision theories, we introduced two variants, defined by Kripke [8] , of the supervaluation jump operator, σ M . Say that a hypothesis h is weakly consistent iff the set {A ∈ S : h(A) = t} is consistent. (Here and elsewhere we follow [3] and use S for the set of all sentences of L + .) Say that h is strongly consistent iff {A ∈ S : h(A) = t} ∪ {¬A : A ∈ S & h(A) = f} is consistent. Note: a classical hypothesis is strongly consistent iff {A ∈ S : h(A) = t} is both consistent and complete. The jump operators σ 1 and σ 2 are define for weakly and strongly consistent hypotheses, respectively, as follows: Kripke [8] uses the least fixed point and the greatest intrinsic fixed point to define certain properties of sentences. Fix an evaluation scheme ρ, a ground model M = D, I for L, and a sentence A of L + . We say that A is ρ-grounded in M iff lfp(ρ M )(A) = n, and ρ-intrinsic in M iff gifp(ρ M )(A) = n. Suppose that a, b and c are names in L, and that I(a) = ¬Ta, I(b ) = Tb , and I(c) = (Tc ∨ ¬Tc). Thus ¬Ta is a liar and Tb is a truth-teller. The liar is neither ρ-grounded nor ρ-intrinsic since it gets the value n at every fixed point h. The truth-teller is neither ρ-grounded nor ρ-intrinsic since it gets the value t at some fixed points, the value f at others, and the value n at others. (Tc ∨ ¬Tc) is, for example, μ-and κ-intrinsic and σ -grounded, but neither μ-nor κ-grounded:
in all classical models M ≥ M + h such that the extension of T in M is complete and consistent. Gupta and Belnap [3] define a jump operator σ c M in this way, but for weakly rather than strongly consistent h. Unfortunately, the weak consistency of h does not guarantee the existence of a model M ≥ M + h such that the extension of T in M is complete and consistent. In fact, the existence of such a model M is equivalent to the strong consistency of h. The jump operator σ 2 M is identical to σ c M , with the definition in [3] corrected so that it is restricted to strongly consistent h.
Revision Theories of Truth
Gupta and Belnap's most interesting objection to the fixed-point semantics stems from an uncommon take on a common observation: the observation that there are connectives that fixed-point languages cannot express, for example, exclusion negation, for which ¬n = t; and the Łukasiewicz biconditional, for which (n ≡ n) = t. 7 Their objection is not that there is a gap between the resources of the object language and the metalanguage, but that "there is a gap between the resources of the language that is the original object of investigation and those of the languages that are amenable to fixed point theories." (p. 101) The language that is the original object of investigation can express genuinely paradoxical sentences, whose behaviour is unstable. And one source of the language's ability to express such paradoxicalities is the fact that it can express, for example, exclusion negation. A fixed point language cannot, in the end, express genuinely paradoxical sentences: even the liar behaves stably. So fixed-point theories do not deliver an analysis of the unstable phenomenon that we are trying to understand: "There are appearances of the Liar here, but they deceive." (p. 96)
Working with a purely two-valued object language, Gupta and Belnap imagine beginning with a classical hypothesis h regarding the extension of T, and then revising h by using the classical jump operator, the "rule of revision", τ M . As the revision procedure proceeds (h,
. .), a liar sentence will flip bach and forth between t and f. A truth-teller will keep whatever value it had to begin with. Other sentences might display unstable behaviour to begin with, but eventually settle down to a particular value. Some sentenes will be very well behaved: they will settle down to a truth value that is independent of the initial hypothesis. Gupta and Belnap formalize the carrying out of such procedures into the transfinite, with their notion of a revision sequence.
Given any function F on hypotheses, an F-sequence, or a revision sequence for F, is an ordinal-length sequence S of hypotheses such that S α+1 = F(S α ), for every ordinal α; and every limit ordinal λ, every truth value x, and every d ∈ D, we have
This second clause is the limit rule for F-sequences. Note that if S is an F-sequence, then F is defined on S α for every ordinal α; so, if S is a τ Msequence, then S α is classical for every ordinal α. Any ordinal-length sequence S of hypotheses culminates in h iff there is an ordinal β such that S α = h for 7 In the strong and weak Kleene schemes, (n ≡ n) = n. every ordinal α ≥ β. For the purposes of the revision theory of truth, we are primarily interested in τ M -sequences, but other revision sequences are useful. Note that if ρ = μ, κ, σ , σ 1, or σ 2 and if M is a ground model, then there is a unique
As mentioned, Gupta and Belnap want to formalize the behaviour of truth, instabilities and all. Relative to a ground model M, this behaviour is arguably represented by the class of τ M -sequences: this class delivers a verdict on which sentences are well-behaved or ill-behaved, as well as a representation of how various sentences are ill-behaved. For this reason, Gupta and Belnap propose that the signification of truth is the revision rule τ M , since this rule arguably fits the Gupta-Belnap characterization (see Section 1, above) of an expression's or concept's signification.
The most well-behaved sentences are those that are stably t in every
Accordingly, Gupta and Belnap introduce the revision theory T * :
Definition 3.1 [3] Suppose that M is a ground model for the ground language
We might want to weaken this condition on the validity of a sentence A of L + in a ground model M. In some ground models, there are sentences that are nearly stably t in the following sense: they are stably t except possibly at limit ordinals and for a finite number of steps after limit ordinals. 8 Formally, a sentence A of L + is nearly stably t [f] in the τ M -sequence S iff there is an ordinal β such that for every γ ≥ β, there is a natural number m such that for every n ≥ m, we have S γ +n (A) = t [f]. Gupta and Belnap's theory T # is based on near stability: Definition 3.2 [3] Suppose that M is a ground model for the ground language
Finally, we might put constraints on which hypotheses are legitimate hypotheses concerning the extension of T, and hence on which τ M -sequences are legitimate revision sequences. A natural condition to put on the legitimacy of a classical hypothesis h is that the resulting extension of T be consistent and complete, i.e., that h be strongly consistent. A τ M -sequence S is maximally consistent iff S α is strongly consistent for every ordinal α. Gupta All three revision theories are supervenience theories in the sense of Section 2: the behaviour of truth and the status of various sentences is determined by the nonsemantic vocabulary, whose use is represented by the ground model. There is no other way to go in the revision-theoretic setting: for most ground models M, there is no class H of privileged hypotheses, like the fixed points, such that for distinct h, h ∈ H, we could take the expanded models M + h and M + h to represent distinct languages in which T represents truth. On the revision theories, each language is represented by a ground model, and the behaviour of truth is represented by the various ways in which one hypothesis leads to another as we carry out the revision process.
Three Ways to Compare Theories of Truth
(The harder parts of the proofs of the theorems in this section are reserved for Section 5.) We have on the table thirteen theories of truth: ten fixed-point theories,
and three revision theories, T * , T # , T c . The first relation we define to compare these thirteen theories is the most obvious: Definition 4.1 Given any two theories T and T among our thirteen, we say that T ≤ 1 T iff for every ground language L, every ground model M for L, and every sentence A of L + , if A is valid in M according to T then A is valid in M according to T . We say that T < 1 T iff T ≤ 1 T and T = T . Note that ≤ 1 is reflexive and transitive. 
. This establishes all of the positive claims of the form T ≤ 1 T in Theorem 4.2. The counterexamples in Section 5, below, establish the negative claims of the form T ≤ 1 T .
Of particular interest are ground models in which truth behaves like a classical concept. Suppose, for example, that one is devising a semantics for languages that contain their own truth predicates. All else being equal, one might want a semantics that delivers, whenever possible, something approaching a classical theory: we know that truth behaves paradoxically, but it seems an advantage to minimalize this paradoxicality. Consider, for example, a classical ground model M = D, I that makes no distinctions, other than with quote names, among the sentences of L + : for an extreme case, suppose that the ground language L has no nonquote names, no function symbols and no nonlogical relation symbols. There is no circular reference in the ground model, and there seems to be no vicious reference of any kind. 
dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in the ground model M iff A ∈ V Definition 4.4 Given any two theories T and T among our thirteen theories, we say that T ≤ 2 T iff, for every ground language L and every ground model M for L, if T dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M then so does T . Note that, among our thirteen theories, T ≤ 2 T iff, for every ground language L and every ground model M for L, if T dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M, then every sentence valid in M according to T is also valid in M according to T . (This follows from Theorems 4.2 and 4.5, as noted by an anonymous referee.) We say that T ≡ 2 T iff both T ≤ 2 T and T ≤ 2 T. We say that T < 2 T iff both T ≤ 2 T and T ≡ 2 T . Note that ≤ 2 is reflexive and transitive. Note also that if T ≤ 1 T then T ≤ 2 T . 
Proof The fact that T lfp,μ ≡ 2 T lfp,κ follows from the fact that neither lfp(μ M ) nor lfp(κ M ) is classical in any ground model M. To see that lfp(μ M ) is nonclassical, let M be any ground model and let S be the unique μ M -sequence such that
The following follow from the already proven part of Theorem 4.2:
dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept. So there is a classical hypothesis h in which all maximally consistent τ M -sequences culminate. It suffices to show that h is the greatest fixed point of σ 2 M , in which case gifp(σ 2 M ) = h is classical, in which case T gifp,σ 2 dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. Let h be any fixed point of σ 2 M . Since h is strongly consistent, we can choose a strongly consistent classical h ≥ h . Let S be any maximally consistent τ M -sequence with S 0 = h ≥ h . By the monotonicity of σ 2 M together with the fact that σ 2 M agrees with τ M on all classical hypotheses, we can show by transfinite induction that S α ≥ h for every ordinal α. So h ≥ h , since S culminates in h. So h is the greatest fixed point of σ 2 M , as desired.
To see that 
This establishes all of the positive claims of the form T ≤ 2 T in Theorem 4.5. The counterexamples in Section 5, below, establish the negative claims of the form T ≤ 2 T . The next comparative relation, ≤ 3 , is trickier to motivate, and is best understood in the context of investigating whether this or that theory dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in this or that ground model M.
For starters, it is not always easy to tell whether some theory dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. Gupta and Belnap devote some effort to investigating the circumstances under which, in effect, T * dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in a ground model, though they do not put it in these terms. As we shall see, their investigation can be broadened to theories other than T * . Gupta and Belnap proceed by introducing the notion of a Thomason ground model, and by investigating the circumstances under which a ground model is Thomason.
Definition 4.7 [3] A ground model M is Thomason iff all τ M -sequences culminate in one and the same fixed point.
Theorem 4.8 A ground model M is Thomason iff T * dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M.
Proof This follows immediately from the definitions.
Gupta and Belnap's principal results concerning Thomason models all have the same general form, and all make it relatively easy to show that a wide range of ground models are, in fact, Thomason. The simplest example concerns any ground model M for the ground language L described above: a language with no nonquote names, no function symbols, and no nonlogical relation symbols. Proof This is a special case of Corollary 4.26, below.
The interpretation of a name c is
Gupta and Belnap strengthen this theorem: Suppose that the ground model M can in fact distinguish among sentences of L + , but only among sentences that are in some sense unproblematic, for example among sentences with no occurrences of T or among μ-ungrounded sentences. Then M is still Thomason. Note that (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 4.12 can be reworded as follows: 
Theorem 4.13 Suppose that M is a ground model, that
Gupta and Belnap's other main theorem concerning Thomason models is as follows:
Theorem 4.15 ([3], Theorem 6B.4, Convergence to a fixed point II) Suppose that the ground model M is (S − Y)-neutral and that Y
Proof This is a special case of Theorem 4.21, below.
Gupta and Belnap then go on to ask a related question: Definition 4.17 Suppose that T and T are among our thirteen theories and that, for any ground model M, V M = {A ∈ S : A is valid in the ground model M according to T}. We say that T ≤ 3 T iff for every ground language L, every ground model M for L, and every Y ⊆ {A :
-neutral then T dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. We say that T < 3 T iff T ≤ 3 T and T ≤ 3 T. We will see that ≤ 3 is transitive but not reflexive. 
So T dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M, as desired.
Proof (1) follows immediately from the definitions. For (2), suppose that T ≤ 3 T and that T dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. 
Proof The proofs of (2) and (3) 
Proof See Section 5, below. Assume that the ground model M is X-neutral, where X contains all sentences that have occurrences of T. Let Y = {A ∈ S : T does not occur in
Also, we claim that the proviso in Theorem 4.24 is satisfied for ρ = σ . In particular, for any sentence A, define the sentences
Note that, for any n ≥ 0 and any A ∈ S, we have,
= t}, and
This suffices for the proviso. 
So for any n ≥ 0 and any A ∈ S, both
This suffices for the proviso.
The proof that T lfp,κ ≤ 3 T lfp,σ is similar. Suppose that the ground model M is (S − Y)-neutral where Y ⊆ {A ∈ S : lfp(κ M )(A) = t or lfp(κ M )(A) = f}. First notice that Y ⊆ {A ∈ S : lfp(σ M )(A) = t or lfp(σ M )(A)
= f}. Also, we claim that the proviso in Theorem 4.24 is satisfied for ρ = σ . To see this, let C be the sentence ∀x(Tx ∨ ¬Tx). Note that, for any n ≥ 0 and any A ∈ S, both
So, for any n ≥ 0 and any A ∈ S, both
This suffices for the proviso. Similarly, T lfp,μ ≤ 3 T lfp,σ .
Proofs and Counterexamples
Each of our main theorems, Theorems 4.2, 4.5 and 4.21, makes positive claims of the form T ≤ n T and negative claims of the form T ≤ n T . We also want to show Theorem 4.24 (the Proviso Theorem). Given the work already done in Section 4, it suffices to show Theorem 4.21 (2) and (3), to show Theorem 4.24, and to show the negative claims of Theorems 4.2 and 4.5. We begin with some preliminary notions. Then we prove our Major Lemma (Lemma 5.4) and Major Corollary (Corollary 5.5), which we will use to help establish our results from Section 4. Before that we will use the Major Corollary to give a simplified proof of Gupta and Belnap's Main Lemma from [3] (Lemma 5.6), the lemma that they use to study the conditions under which a model is Thomason: our new proof avoids their double transfinite induction, and their consideration, at one point, of six cases and subcases. 
Lemma 5.2 Suppose that M and M are models of a first-order language L, that N is a set of names in L, and that is an N-restricted isomorphism from M to M . Suppose that ρ = τ , μ, κ or σ . Suppose that every name occurring in the sentence A is in N. Then Val M,ρ (A) = Val M ,ρ (A).

Definition 5.3 Suppose that M = D, I is a ground model for a ground language L, and that Y ⊆ S = the set of sentences of L + . We say that a hypothesis h is superstrongly consistent if h is strongly consistent and h(d) = f for every d ∈ D − S. We say that h = Y h iff h(A) = h (A) for every A ∈ Y. If n is a natural number, we say that h = n h iff h(A)
Note that if h is classical, then τ n M (h) is always classical, but τ ω M (h) might not be.
Lemma 5.4 (Major Lemma) Suppose that M = D, I is a ground model for a ground language L, and that Y ⊆ S = the set of sentences of L + . Suppose that M is (S − Y)-neutral, and that h and h are superstrongly consistent classical hypotheses, with h = n h and h = Y h . Then τ M (h) = n+1 τ M (h ).
Proof Make the assumptions in the statement of the lemma. Let Y * = {A ∈ S :
Now notice that, for every A ∈ S − Y * , we have A ∈ U iff ¬A ∈ V and A ∈ V iff ¬A ∈ U. So U and V have the same cardinality (which might be 0, or some infinite cardinality).
Let be a bijection from U onto V. Define a function : D → D as follows:
Note that is an N-restricted isomorphism from M + h to M + h , where N is the set of names of degree ≤ n. So Val M+h,τ 
Corollary 5.5 (Major Corollary) Suppose that the ground model M = D, I is (S − Y)-neutral, where Y ⊆ S. Suppose that h and h are classical hypotheses such that τ
Proof Make the assumptions in the statement of the corollary. Note that, for n ≥ 0, the hypotheses τ A 1 ), . . . , deg(A k ), deg(B 1 ), . . . , deg(B m )) . 
To show that h(C) = t or f, it suffices to show that σ 2 M (h)(C) = t or f, since h is a fixed point of σ 2 M . For this, it suffices to show that 
)(C) for any classical strongly consistent hypotheses h , h ≥ h. Choose such hypotheses h and h . Note that h and h are
superstrongly consistent, since h(d) = f for every d ∈ D − S. Note that h = k h since h(A) = t or f, for any sentence A of degree < k. Note also that h = Y h . So by our Major Lemma 5.4, τ M (h ) = k+1 τ M (h ). So τ M (h )(C) = τ M (h )(C),
that M is (S − Y)-neutral where i(A) = t or i(A) = f for every sentence A ∈ Y.
We will show that gifp(F) is classical. This will suffice for our claim that
To show that gifp(F) is classical, it will suffice to show that F has a greatest fixed point, which is classical: any classical greatest fixed point is also the greatest intrinsic fixed point. For this, it suffices to show that for any fixed points f and g, there is a classical fixed point h ≥ f, g. So choose any fixed points f and g. Since i is intrinsic, there are fixed points f and g such that f, i ≤ f and g, i ≤ g . Choose classical hypotheses, not necessarily fixed points, f ≥ f and g ≥ g , so that F is defined on both f and g . Here is a picture: 
So h is a classical fixed point of F. In the picture below, the arrow from f to h indicates that any revision sequence, indeed the only revision sequence, that begins with f culminates in h. Similarly for the arrow from g to h.
It now suffices to show that h ≥ f and h ≥ g. For this, it suffices to show that h ≥ f and h ≥ g .
Similarly, h ≥ g , as desired. Our completed picture is as follows:
Proof of Theorem 4.24 Let ρ = σ or σ 1, and make the assumptions in the statement of Theorem 4.24. In this proof, any parenthetical occurrence of 'weakly consistent' should be included if ρ = σ 1, and deleted if ρ = σ . For a reductio, suppose that h 0 = lfp(ρ M ) is not classical.
Let C be a sentence of the least possible degree, say k, such that h 0 (C) = n. We will get a contradiction by showing that h 0 (C) = t or f. Recall that, for any sentence A,
, for any (weakly consistent) classical hypotheses h, h ≥ h 0 . Choose such hypotheses h and h . Note that h = k h , since h 0 (A) = t or f, for any sentence A of degree < k. Note also that h = Y h .
Define six sets:
By the proviso, U 0 and V 0 have the same cardinality as S. Also, note that U 0 ⊆ U ⊆ S, so U has the same cardinality as S. Similarly, so do V, U and V . Define a function : D → D by patching together the identity function on sentences of degree < k, the identity function on Y, the identity function on D − S, a bijection from U onto U , and a bijection from V onto V . Note that is an N-restricted isomorphism from M + h to M + h , where N is the set of names of degree
What's left to prove is Theorem 4.21 (3), and the negative claims in Theorems 4.2 and 4.5. We do this with a series of counterexamples. We will bring it all together after presenting the examples. where I(G)(C) = t iff C ∈ Y, for every C ∈ S. Note that every sentence in Y is nearly stably t in every τ M -sequence, though no sentence in Y is stably t in any τ M -sequence.
We will now show that there is a τ M -sequence S such that the sentence
is neither nearly stably t in S nor nearly stably f in S . So T # does not dictate that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. Incidentally, this falsifies the claim in [3] that "all sentences are nearly stable in all τ -sequences for M" (p. 214).
Define the sets X 0 = Y and
Then there is a τ M -sequence S such that, for each C ∈ Y, each limit ordinal λ and each n ≥ 0, S n (C) = t iff C ∈ X n , and S λ+ω 2 +n (C) = t iff C ∈ Z n , and S λ+n (C) = t iff C ∈ X n and λ is a limit ordinal not of the form α+ω 2 .
Note that S λ+ω 2 +n+1 (B) = t and S λ+ω+n+1 (B) = f, for every limit ordinal λ and every natural number n. So B is neither nearly stably t, nor nearly stably f, in S .
Example 5.8 (Gupta) This example will show that T # ≤ 2 T * and that T # ≤ 2 T gifp,μ . Modify Example 5.7 as follows: Let Y be the smallest set containing each T n A and such that if C ∈ Y then C ∨ C ∈ Y. Note that every sentence in Y is nearly stably t in every revision sequence, but no sentence in Y is stably t or stably f in any revision sequence. So τ M has no classical fixed point. So neither T * nor T gifp,μ dictates that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. But it follows from Claim 2, below, that T # does dictate that truth behaves like a classical concept in M.
Notice that, for any classical hypothesis h and any n ≥ 0, each of the following four sets is countably infinite:
Claim 1 For any two classical hypotheses h and h and any
We prove this by induction on n. The base case is vacuously true. For the inductive step, assume that τ
Consider a ground language L with a one-place predicate G, a nonquote name b , and no other nonlogical vocabulary besides quote names. For any formula B and n ≥ 0, we define − n B as B when n is even and as ¬B when n is odd. 
where n = k − 1. So we can construct a τ M -sequence S for M such that S λ is interesting for every limit ordinal λ and such that the value of Tb never stabilizes. In fact we can assure that Tb is not even nearly stable.
Claim 2 For every
Proof: It suffices to show that every sentence in Y is stably f in every maximally consistent τ M -sequence S . So suppose that S is a maximally consistent
Claim 3 lfp(σ 1 M ) is classical. Proof: It suffices, given Theorem 4.24, to prove that lfp(σ 1 M )(B) = f for every B ∈ Y. Let S be the σ 1 M -sequence that iteratively builds lfp(σ 1) from the null hypothesis: i.e., S 0 (B) = n for every B ∈ S. Note that
So, as in the proof of Claim 2, for every α ≥ ω + 2 and every n ≥ 0, we have 
For nonintersecting U, V ⊆ D, we will use the notation (U, V) for the hypothesis h such that
We will define a jump operator, φ, not on hypotheses, but rather on subsets of S. For each Y ⊆ S,
Though φ is not in any sense monotone, it will come in handy, as we shall see.
Below we will prove that the hypothesis (Y ω , Y ω * ∪ N) is not classical, and is the least fixed point of σ [Y ω ∪N] . Given this, note that the ground model
is not classical, and is the least fixed point of σ [Y ω ∪N] , proceeds through numbered claims.
Claim 1 ∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx) ∈ Y n and ¬∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx) ∈ Y n , for each n ≥ 0. Proof: by induction on n. The base case is vacuously true. For the inductive step, assume that ∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx) ∈ Y n and ¬∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx) ∈ Y n . To show that ∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx) ∈ Y n+1 and ¬∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx) ∈ Y n+1 , it suffices to show that
Before we state Claim 3, we define Before we state Claim 4, we introduce some notation. For U, V ⊆ S, say that U = n V iff for every sentence A of degree < n, A ∈ U iff A ∈ V. 
Claim 4 For every
Note that each of V, W, Z , V , W , and Z is countably infinite, by Claim 3. Also note that
Define by patching together the identity function on U ∪ N, and bijections from V onto V , from W onto W , and from Z onto Z . 
). For Claim 6, it suffices to show by induction on n that Y ω = n Z , for each n ≥ 0. The base case is vacuously true. For the inductive step, suppose that Y ω = n Z . We want to show that
So it suffices to show that for every sentence A of degree < n + 1, if A ∈ Z then A ∈ Y ω . So suppose that deg(A) < n + 1 and A ∈ Z . Then there is some classical
Define seven disjoint subsets of S, as follows:
Note the following:
Note also that each of the following sets contains sentences of arbitrarily large degree: Z , Z * , and S − (Y ω ∪ Y ω * ). So each of the following sets is countably infinite: V 1 , V 2 and V 3∪ V 3 .
Choose P ⊆ V 3 and Q ⊆ V 3 , so that P∪ Q has the same cardinality as V 2∪ V 3 . And let P 1 = V 3 − P and Q 1 = V 3 − Q. Finally, let J be a set of even numbers of the same cardinality as V 1 . And let K = N − J. K is countably infinite.
To see that is an N-restricted isomorphism from M X to M W , first note that maps the extension of G in M X one-one onto the extension of G in
maps V 1 one-one onto V 1∪ V 1 , and V 1 one-one onto J, and J∪ K one-one onto Example 5.11 (Gupta) Here we modify Example 5.10 to get a proof that T lfp,σ 1 ≤ 3 T lfp,σ 1 . As we shall see, our modified example will also show that T lfp,σ 2 ≤ 2 T lfp,σ 1 . The current example starts like Example 5.10, except that the jump operator φ must now be defined for Y ⊆ S as follows:
Below, we state six claims analogous to the claims made in Example 5.10. Except where indicated, their proofs are exactly as in Example 5.10, except that occurrences of "σ " must be replaced by "σ 1". Before we state our new Claims 1-6, we state a Claim 0.
Claim 0 Y n ∪ {∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx)} is consistent for every n ≥ 0. Proof: by induction on n ≥ 0. The base case is trivially true. For the inductive step, suppose that Y n ∪ {∀x(Tx ⊃ Gx)} is consistent. Note that every sentence in 
Proof of Claims 2-5 Exactly as in Example 5.10.
. Proof: we must modify the construction in the proof of Example 5.10, Claim 6, as follows. First, replace the fourth and fifth sentences of the second paragraph of the proof of Claim 6 in Example 5.10 with the following:
Then there is some weakly consistent classical hypothesis
Then, up until the choice of P ⊆ V 3 and Q ⊆ V 3 , the construction proceeds exactly as in Example 5.10. But before we choose P and Q, we must first prove
Now we will choose P ⊆ V 3 and Q ⊆ V 3 , but more carefully than in Example 5.10. Note that V 3∪ V 3 contains countably infinitely many sentences and is closed under negation. Also, (X ∩ U) ∪ Y ω is consistent. So there are countably infinitely many sentences in V 3∪ V 3 that are consistent with 
The facts in the following table can be established by calculating. The asterisks are classical wildcards, either t or f and the question marks can vary with the wildcards:
If h(B), h(C), h(D), h(E)
= tt * * ft * * * f * * h(B), h(C), h(D), h(E) . (The reason we only need look at these quartuples of truth values is that the proviso in the Transfer Theorem can be dropped for σ .) Thus, h 0 is the only classical fixed point of σ M , and the only fixed point of σ M in which B, C and D are t and E is f. In fact, h 0 is the only fixed point of σ M in which B and C are t, since in any such fixed point D is t and E is f. As for σ 1, let g be the (weakly consistent) hypothesis with g(B) = f, and g(A) = n for every A ∈ S − {B}.
By the monotony of σ 1 M , there is a unique σ 1 M -sequence S with S 0 = g. Furthermore, S is (nonstrictly) increasing, and culminates in a fixed point of σ 1 M , say h 1 . Note that h 1 (B) = f. But h 0 is also a fixed point of σ 1 M , and Let C be the sentence ∃x(Gx & Tx). It will suffice to show that C is stably t in every τ M -sequence, but that gifp(σ 2 M )(C) = gifp(σ 1 M )(C) = gifp(σ M )(C) = n.
For each n ≥ 0, define a set H n of hypotheses, and a set S n of τ M -sequences:
H n = df {h : h is a classical hypothesis, and h(B n ) = t and h(B m ) = f for m = n}, and S n = df {S : S is a τ M -sequence and S 1 ∈ H n } First note that, for any hypothesis h, if h ∈ H n then τ M (h) ∈ H n and if h ∈ ∪ n H n then τ M (h) ∈ H 0 . Thus, for any τ M -sequence S , if S 0 ∈ H n then S 1 ∈ H n and if S 0 ∈ ∪ n H n then S 1 ∈ H 0 . Thus, for every τ M -sequence S , there is a unique n ≥ 0 such that S ∈ S n .
Claim 1 If S , S ∈ S n , then S and S culminate in the same fixed point, which is itself in H n . Choose S , S ∈ S n . Note that not only S 1 , S 1 ∈ H n , but also S m , S m ∈ H n for every m ≥ 1. Thus S m = Y S k for any m, k ≥ 1. Thus, by Corollary 5.5, S ω = S ω is a fixed point of τ M . And note that S ω ∈ H n .
So τ M has a unique fixed point h n ∈ H n , for each n ≥ 0; and every τ Msequence culminates in one of the h n . Note that h n (C) = t, for each n ≥ 0. So C is stably t in every τ M -sequence.
It remains to show that gifp(σ 2 M )(C) = gifp(σ 1 M )(C) = gifp(σ M )(C) = n. We will only give the argument for gifp(σ 2 M )(C); the other arguments are similar.
Define hypotheses h
